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Racial Tensions and U.S. Military (In)Justice in Northern Ireland During World War II 
 
Hedged off from the main American military cemetery in Oise-Aisne, France, is a 
graveyard, known as Plot E, marked by ninety-six small, numbered, black plaques embedded 
in the ground. Each plaque represents an unnamed American serviceman executed by his 
country during the Second World War and a disproportionate number of the ‘dishonorable 
dead’ in this ‘perfectly designed anti-memorial’ are African American, a damning indictment 
of American military justice.
1
 African American servicemen faced severe prejudice and 
stiffer penalties and were much more liable to be executed for murder, as well as jailed for 
other offences, than their white counterparts, a pattern repeated in all theatres of the conflict.
2
  
Being stationed abroad, therefore, offered no respite from Jim Crow: American troops in the 
United Kingdom, for example, were subject to American military law, not British civil law, 
due to the Visiting Forces Act (VFA) a wartime measure hastily passed in 1942. Under the 
VFA, the United Kingdom ceded jurisdiction over American military personnel even in cases 
involving British civilians; this wartime expedient made the British obliquely complicit in the 
often unequal and racist application of American military justice; in addition, rape was a 
capital crime in American military law, though not in British civil law.
3
  
The plaques at Oise-Aisne do not, however, solely represent injustice and certainly not 
as the military defined it; the uncomfortable reality is that almost all of those buried here 
2 
 
committed horrendous crimes, including the central case discussed in here. Yet, this ruthless 
justice, whatever its apparent military, judicial or disciplinary necessity, could be, and was, 
selectively applied. Those interred were not inevitably innocent, though some possibly were, 
and this is neither a condemnation of the death penalty in a wartime context, nor is it 
necessarily exposing a miscarriage of justice, per se (at least in military terms), although it is 
arguably racism which helped to determine the severity or leniency of sentencing; it could 
even be the defining factor. Quite simply, American military justice was not blind, and 
emphatically not color-blind, as it was used to reinforce segregation, and its attendant cultural 
structures, and, significantly, to discourage interracial sex and its tacit acceptance of the 
veracity of the so-called ‘rape myth’.
4
 
This study is yet another demonstration of how American race relations operated and 
continue to operate: unequal justice, inadequate defense, institutional racism, assumptions 
about inherent black criminality and fear of the over-sexualized black man and his apparent 
taste for white women, itself a white European invention which was now being reimported, 
even if the United Kingdom, with its negligible black population, did not have a formal 
‘color-line’.
5
 It occurs when lynching in America was disappearing, if not quite extinguished, 
where Southern courts and their all-white juries shamelessly dispensed justice without a 
noose, but it was lynch law in all but name. The army, rigidly segregated, with many white 
southern commanders, often leading black units, carried these notions with it wherever it 
went; indeed, military discipline enhanced them, and it harshly policed taboo-shattering, 
transgressive, sexual relations whenever it could.
6
 Thus, ten of the eighteen executed in the 
United Kingdom were African American, when only approximately 10% of American 
military personnel were black, statistics which tell their own stark story.
7
 That said, African 
American servicemen could be reprieved, for example, the high profile case of Leroy Henry, 
cleared of a rape near Bristol in 1944, or had sentences commuted, such as Sammie Mickles, 
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who killed a Polish seaman in Edinburgh in November 1942. These two cases, as will be 
shown, both actually confirm the pervasiveness of the military’s institutional racism.  
Northern Ireland, small, comparatively isolated and with no black population, acts as a 
microcosm for this institutional judicial racism, offering an effective case study of how 
racism and double-standards operated. It had its own parliament at Stormont, which was 
subservient to Westminster on foreign and defense policy, and was geographically separated 
from the rest of the United Kingdom by the Irish Sea. Northern Ireland’s sectarian divisions 
between the majority Protestant (pro-British unionists) and minority Catholic (Irish 
nationalist) populations, with the government exclusively made up of the former and 
discriminating against the latter, added an extra layer of complexity to dealings with the 
Americans. American crimes could spark the tinderbox of sectarianism, especially if those 
committed against Catholics went unpunished; therefore, the effective policing of US 
servicemen had much more serious political connotations than elsewhere in the UK. To Irish 
nationalists, the American presence was opportunistically, if ineffectively, protested against 
as further evidence of the apparent illegitimacy of the partition of Ireland, as the Americans 
were publicly condemned as ‘occupiers’ as much as the British were. Moreover, the 
centrality of religion to life in Northern Ireland made it a very conservative society, 
especially regarding female sexuality.
8
   
Plaque number 92 at Oise-Aisne belongs to Private Wiley Harris.
9
 A 26 year-old 
African American native of Georgia, married with a young daughter, Harris was with the 28
th
 
Quartermaster Battalion. In March 1944 he left his camp in Poyntzpass on a twenty-four hour 
pass, seeking alcohol and sex. After taking a train to Belfast and checking into the ‘colored’ 
American Red Cross Club on James Street, he went to the York Road area where comrades 
were already drinking. By midnight one man would be dead and Harris would be back in the 
Red Cross Club frantically cleaning blood from his uniform. Harris drank steadily and, 
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shortly after 10pm, he willingly paid the one pound asking price to go to an air raid shelter 
with a prostitute named Eileen Megaw. The man who brokered the deal, Harry Coogan, 
waited outside to watch for police.  
Coogan and Megaw had operated similarly earlier: at about 9.30pm she had had sex in 
the same air-raid shelter with Harris’s comrade Sergeant John W. London, so Harris had no 
reason to be suspicious.
10
 Whether pre-arranged or not is unclear, and Megaw was not 
interrogated about it at Harris’s court-martial, but before the two could have intercourse, 
Coogan raised the alarm. On exiting the shelter and retrieving his torch from Coogan, Harris 
saw no police and asked Megaw to return inside. She refused and also refused to return his 
money, after initially, according to witnesses, agreeing to do so.
11
 Harris recalled in his 
statement: ‘I asked the girl for my money. The man said, ‘She can’t give you the money 
back.’ The girl started to run and I grabbed her…. the girl and I were trying to pick up the 
money, just at this time the man hit me a blow on the right cheek with his fist and a crowd 
began to gather.’
12
 She dropped the coins and she and Harris scrambled to retrieve them, 
while doing so, Coogan shouted, according to eyewitness Annie Murdoch, ‘This nigger is 
going to stab this woman but I’ll not let him’ and punched Harris.
13
 Her sister-in-law, Bridget 
Murdoch, grabbed Coogan’s arm and urged him not to hit Harris. Harris retaliated by 
stabbing Coogan sixteen times in the body and head with a knife he had in his pocket, while 
Megaw fled screaming. With a crowd gathering and Coogan prostrate in a pool of blood, 
Harris too fled, pursued by James Tynan.
14
  
At the Red Cross Club, witnesses saw Harris with blood on his hands and clothes. The 
following day back in Poyntzpass Sergeant James O’Connor from the United States Army 
Criminal Investigation Division (CID), told Harris he was his friend and took a statement.
15
 
Harris, without legal representation, recounted the previous night’s events, admitting to 
stabbing Coogan. Within ten days Harris had been tried, convicted and sentenced to death. In 
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May he was hanged at Shepton Mallet prison in Somerset.
16
 Harris’s guilt is undeniable: he 
was armed and subjected Coogan to a ferocious assault.
17
 Yet, questions remain. Harris was 
not the first American to kill a civilian in Northern Ireland, but where previous white killers 
were given long jail sentences and dishonorable discharges, he was the first to be executed, 
and his race set him apart. 
‘Absolute and Exclusive Jurisdiction’: The Imported Context 
The theoretical basis of this piece is primarily J. Robert Lilly and J. Michael Thomson’s 
1997 article ‘Executing US Soldiers in England, World War II’, which offers excellent 
analysis of the political, military and judicial context of capital cases involving US soldiers in 
the United Kingdom.
18
 Their research demonstrates that the death penalty ‘has been 
disproportionately applied to the financially disadvantaged, people of colour (especially 
African Americans) and those with white victims’ and this certainly applies to Harris.
19
 They 
go much further, however. They examine the ‘imported context’ of the American presence, 
endorsed by Westminster and Stormont and underpinned by the VFA. As they elaborate, ‘the 
‘imported’ model emphasizes the notion that judicial culture is brought in from the outside, a 
process not unlike the importation and imposition of cultural hegemony by a colonial 
power’.
20
 This, they argue, happened in the United Kingdom, a view supported by Allison 
Gough: ‘the military acted as a conduit for the exportation of American racial attitudes during 
World War II. In the name of military efficiency and expediency, and with claims that the 
Army should not be an organ of social change Jim Crow practices... were transplanted.’
21
 
With American justice, therefore, came racial discrimination and both Westminster and 






The difficulties encountered by minorities within the military judiciary were 
compounded by the emphasis upon achieving convictions and the insinuation that too 
meticulous a defense would hamper the lawyers’ careers. The onus was on short trials, 
tokenistic defense and convictions:  
The power of military commanders greatly influenced, if not in fact determined, the outcome of 
courts-martial trials, including capital cases…. [commanders] select the officers who serve as 
prosecutors, defense counsel and jurors, while retaining the power to evaluate these officers’ 
performances and thus influence their future careers…. Vigorous defense efforts were not only 
discouraged, but considered egregiously hostile acts toward command.
23
  
Defense counsels, often career soldiers rather than lawyers, were underprepared, granted few 
resources, beyond access to the defendant, and were wary of alienating superiors, while 
convictions rather than acquittals served military justice. To make matters worse, charges 
were brought by officers, who were almost invariably white.
24
 All of these factors are 
pertinent to the Harris case. In a later work, Lilly notes that civilian and military justice have 
very different motivations and goals: ‘civilian rulers see military justice as extensions of 
civilian justice, while career militarists view the courts as a means of discipline.’
25
 Elizabeth 
Hillman concurs, seeing courts-martial as a disciplinary means to maintain ‘obedience and 
conformity’.
26
 ‘Military justice’, Lurie concludes, ‘is virtually inseparable from military 
discipline’.
27
 A 1943 text used at the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) school at the 
University of Michigan confessed as much: ‘Strictly speaking, a court-martial is not a court at 
all in the full sense of the term, but simply an instrumentality of the executive power of the 
President for enforcement of discipline in the armed forces’.
28
 Harsh sentencing, including 




In a global war and a multi-million man army, there was logic in circumventing the 
niceties of jurisprudence. Indeed, a functioning military legal system that tried to reflect the 
values of civilian law is noteworthy. That said, the system was unforgiving for anyone, black 
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or white, ensnared by it, with extraordinarily high conviction rates, disproportionate 
punishment and massive discrepancies in sentencing for the same crimes, factors grotesquely 
magnified when race became involved.
30
 The Americans sought jurisdiction over their men 
not simply out of distrust of other countries’ judicial systems and their ability to treat their 
soldiers fairly, although this is implicit; rather, a predominantly conscript army required a 
very specific legal system tailored to cope with both its scale, and the necessity of 
maintaining discipline and morale within what was, in effect, an involuntary force; this force, 
therefore, had to be accountable solely to American military law.
31
 These factors became 
unavoidably and inevitably interlocked with American racial prejudice. Perhaps ironically, 
the procedures employed in the Second World War were a flawed response to the racist and 
summary application of military justice in the First World War. 
The ‘Houston Riot’ of August 1917 began after a dispute between local police and 
African American troops descended into a gun battle that left twenty people dead: four of the 
soldiers, four policemen and twelve civilians. It resulted in the execution of nineteen African 
American soldiers and life sentences for a further forty-one during three trials. Thirteen of the 
executions took place within a week of the first trial, swiftness in accordance with the 
contemporary Articles of War; yet it left no time for appeals.
32
 After the second court-martial, 
new rules were introduced, General Orders No. 167, preventing executions until the cases had 
been reviewed by JAG and, ultimately, death sentences required presidential approval. Six 
more executions resulted, along with a number of commuted sentences. President Woodrow 
Wilson publicly declared the trials fair and the executions justified.
33
  
Boards of Review were set-up in 1919, evolving into The Manual for Courts Martial of 
1928, the basis for American military law in the Second World War.
34
 Due to the VFA, Lilly 
asserts, the manual became ‘the only legal umbrella under which troops would be tried and 
punished.’
35
 The Judge Advocate General during the war, General Myron C. Cramer, was 
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responsible for courts-martial, while the Boards of Review, containing three senior officers, 
located within the Branch Office of the Judge Advocate General (BOTJAG), ensured 
convictions were sound. In addition, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) advised commanders 
prior to trials on the need for a court-martial, and then reviewed convictions afterwards. After 
a trial, the Board of Review would confirm or commute the sentence, before it was signed off 
by the JAG or one of his deputies. Evidently aware of racial discrimination within system, 
from December 1943, courts-martial of African Americans had to have a black officer 
present.
36
 Acknowledging the lack of African American officers, a memorandum explaining 
the policy was circulated from March 1944; however, commanders could only re-distribute it 
by word-of-mouth: hard-copies were not to be reproduced.
37
  
Stormont enthusiastically received American soldiers in January 1942 and, despite 
some reservations at cabinet level, it also accepted the VFA. The death penalty still operated 
for murder throughout the United Kingdom; in Northern Ireland there had been eight 
executions since its formation in 1921. In September 1942 six Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
terrorists were sentenced to death for the murder of a police officer, although ultimately only 
the teenage ringleader was executed.
38
 Britain, including Northern Ireland, readily accepted 
the need for death penalty, even if both were generally circumspect in its application.  
In June 1942, Northern Ireland’s Attorney General, John MacDermott, having been 
‘consulted informally’ on the Visiting Forces bill by London, reported to the cabinet. ‘Its 
most important feature,’ he concluded, ‘was the withdrawal from all courts in the United 
Kingdom of any criminal jurisdiction’ and granting American service courts ‘an absolute and 
exclusive jurisdiction’ over criminality by American troops. He felt, nonetheless, that the 
power to pursue criminal proceedings should be retained and exercised expediently, for 
example, civil trials could be periodically pragmatic and in everyone’s interests, particularly 
as ‘local feeling may make the Americans anxious to have a trial in the civil courts,’ but only 
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with the express consent of the ‘appropriate American authority’.
39
 Thus, Stormont would 
defer to the Americans, demonstrating the legal foundation for Lilly and Thomson’s notion of 
imported context, if not recognizing its potential consequences. The cabinet approved, 
enabling the Americans and Stormont to act with a degree of flexibility. MacDermott’s 
instincts were generally sound, insofar as the Americans saw the benefit of public trials in 
capital cases, nonetheless these would be courts-martial as they would not cede jurisdiction, 
moreover, civilian witnesses would be subject to American military processes. The 
Americans did at least recognize the need for justice to be seen to be done.  
Keenly aware of the Catholic Church and the Eire government’s public hostility to the 
American presence, Parker Buhrman, the American consul in Belfast, fretted constantly about 
relations between Americans and locals. Though unspoken by Stormont, Buhrman recognised 
that the murder of a Catholic could drive a wedge between this community and the 
Americans and even become a pretext for terrorism aimed at Americans. Buhrman believed, 
for example, that the priest at the funeral of Edward Clenaghan, killed by two Americans in 
September 1942, was attempting to incite violence against Americans.
40
  Certainly there was 
an Irish nationalist tradition of eulogizing the dead as a way of motivating the living, yet 
Buhrman was unduly paranoid. An American padre attended the service as did members of 
Clenaghan’s Air Raid Protection (ARP) unit, hardly evidence of the deceased’s radicalism.   
‘Wounds Feloniously Inflicted’: Killings by White Americans   
During the so-called American ‘occupation’ of Northern Ireland, which occurred in two 
stages, from January to November 1942 and from November 1943 until June 1944, US 
soldiers were responsible for seven deaths, killing five civilians, one British soldier and one 
American soldier. American soldiers committed many other crimes, mainly vandalism and 
brawling (local newspapers did not report sex crimes, and they rarely appear in police reports 
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to the government), and were often the victims of civilians or British servicemen 
themselves.
41
 Given the numbers stationed in Northern Ireland, 120,000 on the eve of D-Day 
in 1944 (out of a population of 1.2 million) and 300,000 overall, the availability of alcohol 




As the first place to host Americans, Northern Ireland would become the incubator for 
how the United Kingdom responded to American military justice, witnessing, for instance, 
the first court-martial for the killing of a civilian. It saw the first murder of an African 
American soldier by his white comrades, which was the only case there which did not result 
in a trial, illustrating the lack of judicial rigor where the victim was black. It also saw the first 
killing of a British soldier by an American and the first convictions for Americans who killed 
civilians; these latter convictions became templates for future courts-martial, including that of 
Harris, and showed how racism affected mitigation and sentencing. Late in the war, there was 
a rare example of a professional defense by committed career lawyers for a soldier accused of 
murder (and, in this case, rape).
43
  
The seven cases have some commonalities, and also notable differences. In only one of 
the five involving civilians was the alleged assailant on duty. Only one was racially 
motivated with a black victim; drunkenness was a prime factor in five, including the one 
fatality involving British and American soldiers. One involved sexual violence, but two 
involved prostitution. Two of the cases directly involve race: William Jenkins, an African 
American soldier, was shot by American Military Police (MPs) in Antrim in September 1942; 
and in March 1944, Harris murdered Coogan in Belfast. The other cases, all involving white 
GIs, will be analysed to suggest that racism, alongside his crime, sealed Harris’s fate. 
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The first court-martial open to the public occurred in April 1942 after the shooting dead 
of a bus driver, Albert Rodden, by Sgt. William Clipsham in County Londonderry. A civilian 
death necessitated a coroner’s inquest, which, in this case, preceded Clipsham’s court-
martial. This was potentially problematic for both civilian and military authorities if the 
coroner’s jury and the court-martial came to radically different conclusions; still it inferred 
that Americans were somewhat accountable to the local authorities. If the verdicts coincided, 
the coroner would legitimize the court-martial and ease local tensions.
44 
In Rodden’s case, the 
open verdict broadly agreed with the later court-martial, declaring his death accidental.
45
  
The openness of Cilpsham’s court-martial served an important public relations 
function, showing that the Americans were not condoning their soldiers’ actions and justice 
would be served.
46
 The trial heard that Rodden’s bus joined an American convoy, cutting off 
the last vehicle, Clipsham’s scout car, and according to several American witnesses, refused 
to let Clipsham pass by seemingly purposely blocking the road. When the car eventually 
drew alongside the bus, the bus swerved knocking it into a kerb, causing the machine gun 
mounted on the vehicle near Clipsham to fire, killing Rodden and making his bus crash. The 
court-martial unanimously concluded that the weapon was defective and was triggered by the 
car hitting the kerb; Clipsham was cleared of manslaughter.
47
 
The next death involved the endemic inter-racial antipathy among American 
servicemen in the United Kingdom. The authorities offered various solutions, including 
informal segregation, displacing rather than eliminating tensions, and inter-racial violence 
remained a problem throughout the Americans’ sojourn.
48
 Violence was usually instigated by 
white Americans resentful that African Americans refused to be subservient, with particular 
hostility for relationships between African Americans and local women. The military’s 
response was to publicly condemn violence, but privately reinforce Jim Crow, refusing to 
confront the white troops’ behavior. Limited, half-hearted and poorly implemented remedial 
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efforts failed as, generally, commanders devolved responsibility to junior officers and NCOs, 
often in the form of ‘Good Conduct Committees’.
49
 The seriousness of the problem had fatal 
consequences in September 1942 when Pvt. William Jenkins was, as noted, shot by white 
MPs in the town of Antrim. His comrades found his body handcuffed to railings and, enraged 
by the hallmarks of a lynching, returned to base, broke into the armory, before around twenty 
of them, now armed, headed back to town.
50
 Several white soldiers were accosted by the 
group and one was shot and wounded.
51
  
The US military was sufficiently concerned to send General Benjamin O. Davis, the 
army’s first African American general, to investigate racial friction.
52
 His eventual report was 
condemned by the African American press as, while it criticized commanders, it underplayed 
inter-racial tensions.
53
 Amid questions about racism and segregation, the fate of Jenkins was 
ignored. No-one stood trial for his murder, despite him being killed by MPs who should have 
been identifiable (an MP sergeant was ‘standing near’ Jenkins’s body when the latter’s 
commanding officer arrived); the murder weapon was American and probably traceable.
54
 
Tellingly, General Davis made no attempt to prosecute the culprits and it would seem that 
little effort was made to do so; all starkly illustrating the lack of investigative thoroughness 
where the victim was black.
55
 Had there been a court-martial, then the military was under no 
obligation to make it public or involve local authorities, moreover, there was no civil inquest, 
as it was essentially an internal American matter.
56
 The only person to be court-martialled 
was Private George McDaniels, who shot the white soldier and was found guilty of assault 
with a deadly weapon; he received five years’ imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge.
57
 
The British and Americans correctly anticipated friction between their armies. In 
August 1942, a brawl at a dance in Randalstown resulted in the fatal stabbing of a Scottish 
soldier Pvt. Owen McLoughlin, an active participant, and the stabbings of two Americans.
58
 





 The American accused of killing McLoughlin, Pvt. William E. Davis was 
tried the following month.
60
 The hearing lasted two days, where most hearings for capital 
cases lasted one day. Found not guilty of murder, he was convicted of manslaughter and 
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment with a dishonorable discharge.
61
 National rivalry and 
pay, caused Anglo-American tensions; but on this occasion, Burhman, who held British 
troops largely culpable, was not particularly concerned.
62
 The local police were also fairly 
phlegmatic about the incident.
63 
Edward Clenaghan was killed by two American soldiers near Aghalee in County 
Armagh on 21 September 1942. Working at his mother’s pub, Clenaghan argued with 
Privates Herbert G. Jacobs and Embra H. Farley who were drunk and refusing to leave. After 
clearing the pub, Clenaghan and his brother James heard a window being broken. Outside the 
two soldiers, ‘started to use filthy language and produced two beer bottles which they were 
waving about’.
64
 Edward left on his bicycle to complain to their commander; when he did not 
return, James searched for him, finding him in a ditch and his bicycle gone. He died later that 
night of a fractured skull. 
The coroner’s investigation took place the following day - with American 
representatives present - and the court-martial on 8 October, producing almost identical 
narratives, confirming the chronology previously outlined in the press.
65
 Jacobs claimed no 
recollection beyond arguing with James Clenaghan who ‘said he would cut their throats’, 
then struggling with Edward in a ditch, and hitting him with his helmet.
66
 The one-day trial 
generated considerable local interest and Buhrman was again anxious.
67
 Police Commissioner 
Ewing Gilfillan, noted that ‘considerable resentment was caused in the locality at the time, 
but this has now subsided owing to the vigorous action taken by the American authorities in 
assisting in the investigation.’
68
 This was two days after the trial, so Gilfillan’s optimism is 
perhaps premature.  
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As was often the case in capital courts martial, the accused declined to take the stand, 
relying on pre-trial statements for their defense. Defense counsel claimed, despite the 
overwhelming evidence, that there was ‘a reasonable doubt that they were the guilty men’, an 
odd strategy, in the face of potential death sentences, especially as James Clenaghan had 
identified Jacobs.
69
 After short closing statements from the defense and prosecution, the court 
recessed briefly, before the two were found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to ten 
years’ imprisonment.
70
 The Belfast Telegraph reported that Farley and Jacobs ‘appeared to be 
overjoyed’; perhaps more surprisingly, several witnesses ‘congratulated them upon escaping 
the death penalty.’
71
 This reaction seemed to confirm Gilfillan’s view of no residual 
resentment locally; moreover, as justice was swift and decisive, the court-martial represented 
an American judicial and public relations success.  
On 4 October 1942, Private Lawrence McKenzie was drinking whiskey in his barracks 
near Castlewellan, County Down, and, drunk, he made the short walk to Mary Jane ‘Minnie’ 
Martin’s cottage beside the base. Martin was 48 years old, a deaf-mute and a known 
prostitute. There, McKenzie wrote on a piece of paper that he wanted to go upstairs, and the 
pair agreed a price. As they began to have intercourse, the bed broke and she panicked, 
making noises unintelligible to McKenzie, he tried to silence her, putting his hands around 
her throat. She was found dead by a neighbor several days later. 
McKenzie visited a local priest before admitting his guilt in a sworn statement 
voluntarily given to police.
72
 He was initially charged with murder, reduced to manslaughter 
at his court-martial, found guilty and sentenced to ten years’ hard labor. The court-martial 
accepted that there was no malice-aforethought and that his drunkenness which, while not a 
mitigating factor, had clouded his judgement. The Review Board upheld the original verdict 
and punishment. It also stated that the fact the assailant and victim were having sexual 
intercourse ‘can have no legal force in determining whether the homicide was murder. The 
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fact that they were engaged in such act when the homicide occurred is, however, relevant and 
material evidence’.
73




McKenzie can consider himself, more so that Jacobs and Farley, very fortunate to avoid 
the noose. The court-martial and, particularly, the review took a fairly lenient view of what 
constituted manslaughter, rather than murder, and the fact that McKenzie was drunk, had not 
planned to kill Martin and the lack of evidence of sexual violence spared him. The review 
said of his drunkenness: ‘while it is true that voluntary intoxication is no defense, the fact that 
accused was in such condition has a direct bearing and relevancy in determining his intention 
and purpose…. He acted under the impulse of passion accentuated by his intoxication’.
75
 The 
coroner reported on 8 October, in the review’s words, that ‘there were no signs of rape 




Despite some fundamental differences, the Clenaghan and Martin cases are the most 
pertinent to the Harris court-martial, highlighting institutional racism where Harris is 
concerned. These cases establish that Americans who drunkenly killed civilians could receive 
relative leniency, resulting in manslaughter verdicts. They took place some eighteen months 
before Harris’s trial, but two of the three judge advocates on the Board of Review, B. 
Franklin Riter and Birney M. Van Benschoten, were involved in all of the cases, creating a 
reasonable expectation of consistency. The cases were also, crucially, specifically used by 
Riter, Van Benschoten and Ellwood Sargent (who did not preside in the earlier reviews) in 
relation to premeditation in the Harris case. ‘Within the principles of CM ETO82, McKenzie 
and CM ETO72, Jacobs and Farley’, they ruled, ‘there was neither adequate provocation nor 
hot-blooded mutual combat’.
77
 This reinforces the sense that the mitigation accepted in the 
Clenaghan and Martin cases, especially McKenzie’s drunkenness (not to mention his ‘lustful 
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conduct’), helped to determine premeditation (or lack of it) and what constituted provocation, 
is summarily dismissed in Harris’s trial. Moreover, Farley and Jacobs, and McKenzie’s 
arguably unprovoked violence lacked the element of self-defense; the ferocity of Harris’s 
retaliation was emphasized, while allowances were made for white Americans. Harris, shorn 
of mitigating factors, was exposed to the harshest sanctions of American military law.  
‘Notes on Relations with Colored Troops’: Stereotyping Justice 
There was a perception both within the American military and among elements of the 
British public, as Sonya Rose notes, that ‘unbridled sexuality and lack of self-control were 
racial traits’.
78
 Paranoia about black male sexuality and interracial sex is important in 
understanding the Harris case. Even as late as 1944, interracial sex was seen as abnormal 
(interracial marriage was illegal in around US 30 states), while some British officials viewed 
it as sexual perversion.
79
 Westminster privately discouraged fraternisation between African 
Americans and locals, particularly women and feared that ‘brown babies’ would be left 
behind, leading to some ill-advised and offensive missives from British officials.
80
 Added to 
this were archaic views of female sexuality; as Rose notes, ‘young women and girls who 
frolicked with soldiers, especially African American soldiers, were depicted in terms that 
defined them as selfish and irresponsible’ and those who associated with black soldiers were 
seen as ‘especially immoral or degraded’.
81
 
The American military hierarchy subconsciously sought to protect white womanhood 
meaning that the importation of Jim Crow included keeping black men away from British 
women. Informally, white soldiers attacked black violators and shunned the white women 
they associated with. Officialdom operated slightly more subtly, though with much the same 
intentions, and also draconically: of the eighteen Americans executed in the United Kingdom, 





 Four other Americans were executed for rape and murder: two were white, one was 
black and the other Latino; the remaining eight, including two African Americans, were 
executed for murder.
83
 American servicemen had to have the permission of their 
commanding office to marry a British woman, a right rarely granted to African American 




These attitudes were prevalent in the southern states, where the very suggestion that a 
African American man had had sex with a white woman could result in a lynching, a 
ritualistic and fatal deterrent; there were even those who believed that sex between a black 
man and a white woman was by definition non-consensual. In one African American unit 
stationed in the South, for example, the white officer put up a notice stating that any 
association with white women would be regarded as rape, and reminded his men that this 
carried the death penalty.
85
 The legal system in the American south did not always kill 
transgressors, or those merely accused of violating the southern sexual caste system, but, as 
demonstrated by the Scottsboro case in 1931, anyone convicted of challenging southern 
mores (regardless of their actual guilt) potentially faced a ‘judicial lynching.’
86
 Scottsboro 
was merely the most blatant illustration of the disproportionality of American justice where 
the defendants were white and the accused black: black on white crime was invariably more 
severely dealt with than white on black crime; and American justice, both civilian and 
military (uniformed African American soldiers were subject to both), functioned to maintain 
the racist status-quo. After his resignation as Civilian Aide to the War Department in January 
1943 over the failure tackle racism in the military, Judge William H. Hastie, the first African 
American federal judge, privately complained that ‘the Army’s use of military and civilian 
Courts to keep Negroes in their place through the imposition of specially harsh and severe 
punishment upon men who have expressed resentment against Jim Crow practices, is a 
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On some occasions African Americans would either be exonerated, the Leroy Henry 
case, or have a death sentence commuted, the Sammie Mickles case, to take two examples; 
but even these actually reinforced American fears about the intersection of race and sex in 
military justice. In 1944, Henry was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death, until it 
emerged that he had been having an affair, or at least had an ‘arrangement’, with his married 
accuser. Residents of Bath sent a 33,000 signature petition to Eisenhower and, as a result, he 
refused to confirm the death sentence, cleared Henry, and ordered him back to his unit with a 
clean record.
88
 Once again, racism and sex, supported by flimsy, if convenient, evidence, 
arguably determined the harshness of the punishment. Mickles, by contrast, stabbed a Polish 
seaman called Jan Ciapciak in Edinburgh in November 1942.
89
 The two had an altercation, 
after which Mickles returned to Ciapciak and stabbed him to death. Mickles was initially 
sentenced to death in late December, the first imposed upon an American in the United 
Kingdom, this reduced it to life imprisonment by the Review Board which ruled that, despite 
returning after the initial incident to stab Ciapciak, Mickles had not shown premeditation.
90
 
The Review Board found other technical problems with Mickles’ conviction, but, unlike 
Harris, he clearly was not acting in self-defense and Ciapciak posed no threat when stabbed 
and the killing was not in the heat of the moment.
91
 The absence of any kind of sexual 
context in this incident, a mere brawl between servicemen of different nationalities, may have 
helped to spare Mickles. 
‘The Negro’: The Harris Trial 
The opinion of the SJA before Harris’s trial declared him guilty, noting that his 
statement ‘was voluntarily made in full recognition of his rights’; that he had ‘viciously 
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stabbed’ Coogan and crucially concluding that he was not drunk, thus eliminating possible 
mitigation.
92
 This was despite Megaw stating that Harris was ‘feeling the liquor’, and one of 
his comrades confirming that he had been drinking since 5pm (the killing occurred after 
10pm) and was ‘pretty high’.
93
 The SJA found sufficient evidence of ‘prima facie case for 
murder because of the knife being in his hand prior to being struck, the excessive force used 
to meet the assailant, and the furious viciousness of the wounds inflicted upon the deceased, 
from which malice and premeditation may be inferred’.
94
 This analysis was provided by 
Colonel Robert C. Bard, who would also conduct the SJA’s review, which confirmed the 
conviction and sentence. The officer who advised the court-martial that Harris was guilty of 
murder, therefore, would also judge the appropriateness of its verdict and sentence, 
essentially predetermining the review and rendering it and the trial foregone conclusions, 
except in the unlikely event of Riter, Van Benschoten and Sargent, the judge advocates on the 
Board of Review, overturning the conviction.
95
 
Harris’s nationality intrigued the local press more than his race.
 96
 The American 
military were evidently much more mindful of Harris’s skin color than locals: when locals 
were testifying, they tended to refer to Harris as ‘the soldier’ or ‘the colored soldier,’ whereas 
members of the court, including Harris’s own defense counsel, 1st Lieutenant DeWitt D. 
Irwin, often called him ‘the negro soldier’ or simply as ‘the negro.’
97
 The open trial, at 
Victoria Barracks, was attended by hundreds of locals who arrived early to secure a seat, and 
was reported extensively by all of Belfast’s newspapers.
98
 
Before the court-martial, evidence was gathered by the US Army CID and the local 
police, questioning soldiers and civilians respectively, and these statements were almost 
identical to the trial testimony. A narrative was quickly established, including confirmation 
from Megaw, an example of a young woman who had become ‘an amateur prostitute’ during 
to the war, that all three were drunk, Coogan, in fact, was ‘highly intoxicated’ and had ‘struck 
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out and hit the American chap’.
99
 She had met Sergeant London before and had had sex with 
another African American soldier in an air-raid shelter a couple of weeks previously. She 
admitted refusing to return the money, conceding, not only that ‘If I hadn’t been drunk I 
would have handed it to him’, but also that Coogan would have prevented this regardless.
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Like many defendants, Harris chose not to testify but did take the stand to explain the 
context of his statement.
101
 He said that O’Connor told him that he ‘was from the States. He 
came here to help me. He was my friend.’ Harris claimed that O’Connor said that it would be 
easier for him if he gave a statement, but he was made no promises, offered no reduction in 
punishment and was not coerced.
102
 Under prosecution (known as the Trial Judge Advocate) 
direct-examination, he admitted agreeing to make the statement, not realizing that it could be 
used against him.
103
 The president of the court nevertheless declared that, ‘the accused 




Harris was condemned, firstly, by the presence of the knife (or something ‘shiny’), 
which two witnesses, Annie Murdock and Kathleen McGinness, saw in his hand before 
Coogan punched him; the acceptance by the court that he posed an immediate threat to 
Megaw; and, particularly, the ferocity of his retaliation.
105
 Harris claimed that his knife was 
closed and in his pocket when struck and that he acted in self-defense, unaware if his 
assailant, who was shorter but of heavier build, was armed.
106
 The court-martial rejected his 
account, accepting instead the testimony of McGinness, who stated: ‘He [Harris] had the 




Irwin’s Assistant Defense Counsel was 1
st
 Lt. Frederick D. Morrison, of the 46
th
 Field 
Artillery Battalion, not to be confused with the colored 46
th
 Field Artillery Brigade, meaning 
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that the requirement of having an African American officer present at the trial was not 
fulfilled.
108
 The defense contended that Coogan and Megaw conspired to defraud Harris and 
had worked in this way before, despite this, Irwin did not think to ask Megaw about this 
under cross examination; it also demonstrated, and this was largely the extent of Irwin’s case, 
that Harris had not threatened Megaw.
109
  Irwin at least demanded the downgrading of the 
charge as there ‘has been no showing of premeditation’.
110
 The prosecution disagreed, 
successfully arguing that Harris was visibly in possession of a knife, even if struck first; 
moreover: ‘sixteen wounds inflicted upon a man of smaller size would show that there was 
malice aforethought.’
111
 The charge was not reduced. The prosecution emphasized that Harris 
was armed and retaliated violently when he could have easily fled; moreover, the prosecution 
said that he should have fled, speculating that he was motivated by sexual frustration and 
monetary loss, rather than fear: ‘As for provocation, the prosecution knows of no basis for 
considering that one who has invested one pound in an attempt to secure sexual pleasure is 
justified in taking another’s life in order to obtain back that one pound which he feels he has 
not received proper satisfaction for’.
112
 Harris was unanimously found guilty and sentenced 
‘To be hanged by the neck until dead.’
113
 
That Harris killed Coogan is beyond doubt. His statement incriminated him, and, 
besides, witnesses saw him with blood on his hands and clothes at the American Red Cross 
Club, even if only one person at the crime-scene, James Tynan, could positively identify him 
at the trial (although he could not in his initial statement).
114
 Even Megaw conceded in her 
original statement: ‘I would not be able to recognize this American soldier again.’
115
 Unlike 
the killers of Clenaghan and Martin, he could make a case for self-defense. He had been hit 
first; yet, the court-martial insisted that his retaliation constituted malice aforethought. 
Compared to some Americans executed during the war, Harris was given a fair trial. Equally, 
the court defined manslaughter and premeditation narrowly. Harris’s violence was the vital 
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factor; but the American military knew that letting him off this brutal killing could have a 
serious impact on relations between its troops and locals, indeed, it said as much in letters to 
the local police and Coogan’s family after the execution.
116
 Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
escape the view that clemency was not considered due to racism. Harris’s crime does not 
appear radically different from those committed by Farley and Jacobs, and McKenzie. 
The gap between perceptions of justice in Northern Irish and American eyes was 
demonstrated by Coogan’s inquest and Stormont’s response to Harris’s death sentence. The 
inquest took place less than a week after the court-martial though before the verdict was 
announced, and was at odds with the American military’s conclusions. It declared that Harris 
had acted without malice aforethought or premeditation. Moreover, Dr Love, the Coroner, 
specifically told the jurors to ignore the racial aspect of the case. Love, the Irish News 
reported, ‘said that some of the jurors might be carried away by the fact that a white man had 
been stabbed by a coloured man, but this fact should be swept away from their minds. The 
whole thing was done in a moment of passion, and his impression was that Harris had no 
premeditation or any malice in his mind.’
117
 Love continued: ‘Coogan’s conduct was a 
disgrace to all right thinking men’; the jury found no premeditation.
118
 A coroner’s jury in 
Northern Ireland would not be instinctively sympathetic to Coogan. In a conservative and 
religious society, many would have shared the coroner’s view of Coogan as a ‘moral 
degenerate’.  
Stormont, stripped of jurisdiction by the VFA, was effectively a spectator, allowing the 
Americans to do with Harris as they chose. When the sentence was announced, officials 
privately conceded that they would have ‘exercised the prerogative’ and spared Harris.
119
 
Many churches, unions and private citizens contacted Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke to 
urge clemency, but he was helpless to act.
120
 He wrote in his diary that ‘strong 
representations have been made to have the US coloured man reprieved, but, of course, as 
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this is American business we can only make representations.’
121
 The Duke of Abercorn, the 
monarch’s official representative in Northern Ireland, with Brooke’s blessing, wrote in 
confidence to the American commander, General John C.H. Lee, urging clemency, although 
this was brusquely rebuffed.
122
 As noted, Stormont believed in capital punishment in 
principle, nonetheless it clearly had reservations about Harris’s sentence; however, the case 
revealed its impotence, and illustrates the functioning reality of imported context.  
The American military, then, refused to entertain mercy. The review of the SJA written, 
as noted, by Colonel Robert C. Bard, unsurprisingly endorsed the verdict, but also 
simultaneously condemned Coogan and repositioned him as almost chivalrous and heroic in 
his defense of Megaw. Indeed, the SJA review reads further into the evidence than the trial, 
stressing the sexual element, for example, more so than the prosecution: ‘the accused had 
been sexually stimulated and then by circumstances deprived of satisfaction.’
123
 Bard 
concluded that Harris ‘willingly made a statement amounting to a confession.’
124
 He rejected 
Harris’s claim that he was unarmed until struck, accepting testimony claiming the knife ‘was 
held close to the woman’s back.’
125
 Bard re-argued his pre-trial opinion that Harris tried to 
force Megaw back into the air-raid shelter noting that a ‘disinterested witness’ had seen the 
knife, even if Megaw had not; Coogan, also seeing it, ‘went to her rescue.’ Nowhere else was 
it suggested that Harris was attempting to coerce Megaw back to the shelter, therefore, Bard’s 
assumptions were unsupported by the evidence. Coogan, according to Bard, genuinely 
believed that Harris was going to stab Megaw and was, therefore, ‘fully justified in going to 
her defense.’
126
 Coogan’s use of force was ‘reasonable’ while Harris’s was ‘excessive’, clear 
evidence of malice aforethought. Bard conceded that no witness, including Megaw, could 
identify Harris; but his statement remained voluntary and admissible. Bard also 
acknowledged the local coroner’s conclusions, nevertheless, ‘I cannot agree with the verdict 
and do not feel impelled to change my opinion.’
127
 Yet Bard did accept that Harris ‘does not 
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The Assistant Judge Advocate, Captain H.R. Stadfield, completely concurred with 
Bard’s findings. Lilly and Thomson argue that reviews by junior officers were ‘no more than 
pro-forma check-sheets by officers who dare not contradict their superior’, and Stadfield 
conforms to this.
129
 He agreed that Harris tried to force Megaw back into the shelter, absent 
from any other testimony, and that Coogan genuinely feared for her safety, even while 
accepting that no-one heard Harris threaten Megaw or ‘make any threatening gesture’ before 
Coogan punched him. The evidence, regardless, ‘establishes beyond reasonable doubt,’ 
malice aforethought and premeditation.
 130
 Stadfield, therefore, assumed that Harris did, in 
fact, pose a physical threat to Megaw meaning Coogan’s actions were justified, whereas 
Harris’s retaliation was not. Harris was motivated by sexual frustration and financial loss 
rather than fear and self-defense: ‘The circumstances in respect of his sexual desire being 
thwarted, the loss of his money and the subsequent intervention and attack by deceased are 
not sufficient to constitute such provocation as would in law reduce the crime of a cold-
blooded, deliberate murder to the lesser degree of manslaughter.’
131
 Stadfield accepted that 
only Harris’s statement linked him to the crime as no-one could identify him, but this was 
admissible.
132
 Moreover, ‘the evidence is clear and convincing,’ the trial was fair and there 
was ‘no recommendation for clemency.’
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Bard and Stadfield’s conclusions were endorsed by the BOTJAG Board of Review on 
15 May. Riter, Van Benschoten and Sargent stated, for example, that ‘the deceased thwarted 
accused in the gratification of his lustful desire’.
134
 The implication was again that Coogan 
was actually, or thought he was, defending Megaw. They accepted that he was armed before 
struck, making him the aggressor, ‘although the deceased struck the first blow’, and judged 
that he was not ‘seized with uncontrollable passion or fear.’
135
 They further argued that 
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Harris was not sufficiently intoxicated to excuse his actions; neither did the fact that Coogan 
was ‘a moral degenerate’.
136
 Harris, they concluded, had been given a fair trial and the 
sentence should be carried out.
137
  
Conclusion: Three Tragedies 
The case is instructive in understanding the institutional mind-set of the American 
military when it came to racism, sex and crime. Military law is, of course, as much about 
maintaining discipline as it is about justice, and the punishment of violators serves the 
broader purpose of setting an example to others. In the context of a segregated military, and 
its consequent racial friction, harsh and racialized treatment of those like Harris has a brutal, 
self-serving logic. As Lilly and Thomson note, ‘resistance to Jim Crow meant severe 
sanctions…. The result was almost a paranoid and compulsive enforcement of military 
discipline on African American soldiers found guilty of sex-related crimes’.
138
 Harris could 
have been charged with manslaughter; had he been white, or not been seeking sex with a 
white woman, he may well have served a long jail sentence. Had he been tried in a local 
court, he would almost certainly have been spared. 
The patterns of discrimination against, and excessive penalisation of, African 
Americans in civilian justice in the United States were echoed, exaggerated, and ultimately 
had the same intentions, in the military. The statistics speak for themselves, and the Harris 
case is a good example of the ways in which the insidiousness of American racism operated. 
Harris was guilty of a terrible crime, of that there is no question, one in which the application 
of the death penalty could be rationalized regardless of his race; nevertheless, racism was 
used by the military to ensure and then justify his execution, while the case is infected, both 
blatantly and by implication, by racism and the need to protect the status-quo. Harris also 
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exposes more systemic problems with American military justice, including the passive 
defense he was offered, the lack of an appeal and a preoccupation with sex offences.
139
 
For Harris, each layer of military bureaucracy, ostensibly designed to ensure due 
process and fairness, actually reinforced the findings of the previous one, establishing 
Harris’s obvious guilt and then justifying the death penalty. Bard’s advice on behalf of the 
SJA was then confirmed by the SJA’s review, written by Bard and Stadfield, and then 
endorsed by senior officers at BOTJAG and eventually signed off by Eisenhower. The lack of 
any deviation does point to consistency in judgement and proves, from the military’s point of 
view, the fairness of the trial and the appropriateness of the sentence, and that the checks and 
balances built into the system were effective; yet, it also strongly implies, in line with Lilly 
and Thomson’s model, that Harris’s fate was pre-determined. 
Three tragedies are at the heart of this case, the needless death of Coogan in a drunken 
squabble over a few coins, the execution of Harris for the brutality of his retaliation to 
Coogan’s punch and Megaw, a young woman who would live with the consequences of her 
role in the whole sorry episode. An innocuous evening in a non-descript Belfast bar would 
end two lives and ruin another. In the context of the Second World War, this barely merits a 
footnote, yet in its own way, it shows the disconnection between the values America fought 
for and how it treated its own servicemen, exposing how racism permeated the military’s 
judicial processes, as the maintenance of the racial status-quo, particularly regarding inter-
racial sex, could, if not condemn a man to death, be a convenient pretext to justify the 
ultimate sanction available to the military. 
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